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448 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BLUE-RIBBON JURIES
AND THE CONSTITUTION
Moore v. New York, 68 Sup. Ct. 705 (1948)
Defendants Moore and Haughton were tried and convicted of first
degree murder in a New York trial court before a special jury requested
by the District Attorney, pursuant to state statute,1 which provides for
use of a special jury in cases in which the court finds the matter of
such importance or intricacy as to necessitate a more particular selection
of the panel. Motion by the state for such jury was granted over the
objection of defendants, who then appealed on the ground that Negroes
qualified for jury duty were deliberately excluded from the panel. The
appellate court affirmed. On certiorari, HELD, Justices Murphy, Black,
Douglas, and Rutledge dissenting, that a special, or "blue-ribbon," jury
does not violate constitutional guarantees unless it is proved that pros-
pective jurors are intentionally, systematically, and deliberately excluded
therefrom solely on the basis of race or color.
The Federal Constitution assures every one, regardless of race or
color, that he will not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, or of equal protection under the law.
2
The equal-protection and due-process clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution have been construed by the courts to mean,
among other things, that an individual is entitled to a trial by a jury
from which no race has been systematically or arbitrarily excluded,3
but that he has no right to demand trial by a jury of his own race,
4
nor even by a mixed jury.5 All that the accused may demand is that
prospective jurors be not excluded solely because of race or color. 6 The
term "nationality" has been distinguished from the term "race," and it
has been held that a long uninterrupted failure to call members of a
particular nationality for jury duty does not deprive a member of that
nationality of due process.
7
IN. Y. JUDIc. LAW §749-aa.
"U. S. CONST. A END. XIV, §1.
'State v. Walters, 61 Idaho 341, 102 P.2d 284 (1940).
'Atkins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 65 Sup. Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692 (1945).
'Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 484 (1886).
'Haggard v. Commonwealth, 79 Ky. 366 (1881).
'Sanchez v. State, 147 Tex. Cr. R. 436, 181 S. W.2d 87 (1944).
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The test of the constitutional validity of the selection of juries is
whether the race claimed to be discriminated against was intentionally,
systematically, and deliberately excluded,8 and the burden of proving
such wrongful exclusion is upon the party asserting it.9 A jury drawn
pursuant to a statute specifically excluding Negroes, or stating that only
white citizens may serve as jurors, is invalid because it denies Negroes
equal protection under the law,' 0 but a statute not definitely specifying
qualifications for jurors, and leaving the selection of the panel to the
state or local officials is valid."3 The fact that the representation of a
particular race does not correspond to its percentage of the local popula-
tion is not in itself conclusive; nor need every race in the community be
represented.'
2
Under controlling organic provisions the accused is not deprived of
constitutional rights solely because no members of his own race are
selected on a panel,' 3 nor has he any right to escape the mechanism of
trial merely on the ground that some other means could be devised that
would give him a better chance of acquittal.' 4
A state statute may require, in the selection of a jury panel, certain
economic standing, tests of citizenship, understanding of English, and
general intelligence, even though these tests may disqualify an other-
wise disproportionate number of a particular group or class.' 5 Since the
qualifications for jurors vary considerably throughout the states, a jury
that might be classified as a general jury in one state may meet the
requirements for a special or "blue-ribbon" jury in another.
It is apparent that the selection of juries is reserved to the individual
states, and the growing acceptance of the "blue-ribbon" jury system is
indicated by a recent Florida decision' 6 in which the court recognizes the
value of this method of selecting juries with at least an average level of
intelligence.
Even a casual observance of the professional hangers-on and other
characters that are willing, and even eager, to "waste their time" on
'Moore v. New York, 68 Sup. Ct. 705, 92 L. Ed. 637 (1948).
Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 67 Sup. Ct. 1613, 91 L. Ed. 1517 (1947).
'0Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1879).
"Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U. S. 161, 30 Sup. Ct. 640, 54 L. Ed. 980 (1910).
"Newman v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. R. 645, 187 S. W.2d 559 (1945).
"Moore v. New York, 68 Sup. Ct. 705, 92 L. Ed. 637 (1948).
"Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 7 Sup. Ct. 350, 30 L. Ed. 578 (1887).
"5Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 67 Sup. Ct. 1613, 91 L. Ed. 2043 (1947).
"'See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hargrove, 35 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1948).
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